In preparation for the next influenza pandemic, a comprehensive and action-oriented plan is presently under development that focuses on six major areas: (1) improvements in ongoing virologic and disease-based surveillance systems; (2) vaccination of high-priority target groups, and, given sufficient vaccine supplies, the entire US population; (3) liability programs for vaccine manufacturers and health care providers; (4) research to improve detection of new variants and to accelerate the availability of existing and novel vaccines and antiviral agents; (5) integrated, multicomponent communication systems for rapid information dissemination and exchange; and (6) emergency preparedness plans to provide for adequate medical care and maintenance of essential community services. The sudden and unpredictable emergence of pandemic influenza and its potential for causing severe health and social consequences dictate the need for close collaboration among a wide variety of organizations in both the public and private sectors.
Influenza viruses are well known for their ability to cause
To prepare for the next influenza pandemic, an event considered by most experts to be inevitable [6] , public health officials sudden, pervasive infection in all age groups on a global scale, due in part to their unusual genomic properties. Rapid rates of from around the world have begun to devise strategies by which influenza-related morbidity, mortality, and social disruption evolution in the genes that encode the major antigenic determinants of the virus -the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase might be reduced [11, 12] . This process was revisited in the United States in 1993, when the federal government convened (NA) surface proteins -have led to the emergence of annual a panel of experts from the public and private sectors to review influenza epidemics of varying severity, resulting in Ç750,000 the initial plan developed in 1978 and to assess the nation's excess deaths in the United States since 1958 during interpancurrent capacity to respond to the next pandemic [13] . The demic periods [1 -5] . Segmentation of the genome has led to panel not only considered tasks specifically related to the panperiodic ''antigenic shifts'' of the HA and NA, primarily demic itself but also those aimed at reducing the cumulative through reassortment of gene segments between human and toll of influenza during the current interpandemic period. This avian or swine influenza viruses during chance coinfections, report summarizes major areas discussed by the panel and which can result in the sudden and unpredictable emergence provides a preview of a comprehensive influenza pandemic of pandemic influenza [4 -7] . Recent evidence also suggests preparedness plan for the United States that is presently under that pandemics may be caused by transmission of nonhuman development. viruses to humans without reassortment [8, 9] . Three pandemics have occurred during the past century alone, one of whichthe infamous ''Spanish flu'' of 1918 -was responsible for Precepts and Assumptions ú20 million deaths worldwide, primarily in young adults [10] . Although mortality rates associated with the more recent panBefore considering priority activities that would allow the demics of 1957 (A/Asia [H2N2]) and 1968 (A/Hong Kong United States to better cope with the next pandemic, the panel [H3N2]) were reduced in part by antibiotic therapy for seconddeveloped the following series of precepts and assumptions to ary bacterial infections and more aggressive supportive care guide the planning process. [3, 4, 7] , both pandemics were associated with high rates of The plan must be considered from the outset as a national, morbidity and social disruption, with combined economic and not federal, effort, with broad and active participation by losses of Ç$32 billion (in 1995 dollars) [2 -4, 7] . a wide variety of governmental and nongovernmental organizations at the national, state, and local levels. The overriding objective of the plan should remain consonant of knowledge and technology to national laboratories around the world [19] . Efforts are now underway to expand surveilwith the principal influenza-related goal of the US Public Health Service: to reduce influenza-related mortality [1] . Howlance efforts in China, the country from which pandemic variants such as A/Asian/57 (H2N2) and A/Hong Kong/68 (H3N2) ever, the plan should also place strong emphasis on strategies to reduce morbidity, social disruption, and economic losses, appear to have emerged [6, 7, 20] . There is also growing circumstantial evidence that China may serve as an important important hallmarks of previous pandemics.
Criteria for declaring that a pandemic exists must be caresource of ''drifted'' strains, as evidenced by the more recent detection of variants such as A/Beijing/89 (H3N2), A/Beijing/ fully defined. In addition to exhibiting a major shift in its antigenic makeup (''pandemic alert''), the putative pandemic 92 (H3N2), and A/Nanchang/95 (H3N2) [1, 19] . Thus, expansion of virologic surveillance in China should also improve the strain must also demonstrate the capacity for multifocal outbreaks in geographically dispersed populations before a ''panlikelihood of correct matches between vaccine and wild strains during interpandemic periods. demic'' is formally declared.
The key prevention strategy to reduce pandemic-associated Influenza vaccine development, production, and availability. Domestic influenza vaccine production has increased dramatimorbidity and mortality will be the implementation of mass vaccination programs. It should be assumed from the outset cally to Ç70 million doses annually in recent years [1, 21] , a level at which immunization of the entire population with a that every individual will be susceptible to the pandemic strain and that vaccination of the entire US population will be warmonovalent (pandemic strain) vaccine can be considered a feasible goal. However, current production techniques rely on the ranted and recommended. This strategy may have to be modified, however, depending on the availability of sufficient numavailability of large numbers of embryonated eggs, which could limit production outside the normal influenza vaccine manufacbers of doses of vaccine and the outcome of special studies examining the clinical and epidemiologic features of disease; turing cycle (typically January -August). Moreover, even under optimal current conditions, Ç6 -8 months would be needed such studies should be conducted as soon as possible after the detection of a variant that exhibits an antigenic shift. For from the time a pandemic variant is detected until tens of millions of doses of vaccine would be available for use. In example, if older age groups appear to be less susceptible to infection because of prior exposure and immunity, vaccination view of these limitations, the development of alternative vaccines, use of cell substrates other than eggs, further improveof younger age groups may be considered a higher priority.
While it can be assumed that substantial financial and human ments in high-growth reassortants used in vaccine production, and the development of more rapid methods to reliably assign resources will be made available by the US Congress once a pandemic has been declared, support for interpandemic activipotency (HA content) to bulk vaccines should remain high priorities [22] . Progress in these areas will also have a signifities will likely remain relatively limited. Thus, it is critical to (1) stress the importance of ongoing activities related to the cant impact on vaccine production and availability during interpandemic periods. detection and control of new variants of influenza virus, regardless of the potential for such variants to cause pandemic disease;
Vaccine utilization and coverage. Before 1987, annual influenza vaccination coverage among the elderly in the United (2) strengthen the current infrastructure for surveillance, vaccination, and other essential ''core'' activities at the state and States rarely exceeded 25%, due in part to misconceptions about benefits and risks, missed opportunities for vaccination, local levels; and (3) identify important gaps in existing activities that will require special actions now to ensure that the and marked declines in publicly funded programs at the national, state, and local levels [2] . Annual vaccination coverage United States will be adequately equipped to respond to the next pandemic. Key elements of the plan must also be carefully has increased markedly since that time -to Ç50% -55% in persons age §65 years in 1993 [21] -due to improved inforand continuously integrated with ongoing related initiatives, such as emerging infections [15, 16] , adult immunization [17], mation and education programs sponsored by the public and private sectors, reimbursement by Medicare for vaccination of and emergency preparedness for acts of biologic terrorism [18] . the elderly, increased assumption of responsibility on the part of the private sector in vaccine delivery efforts, and improved Priority Areas and Action Steps perceptions about the benefits of annual vaccination as a consequence of repeated demonstrations of cost-effectiveness Early detection and warning. Timely recognition of new variants of type A influenza viruses must remain the corner- [23 -26] . Despite these improvements in coverage, substantially greater efforts are needed to reach the estimated 25 milstone of pandemic preparedness. Virologic surveillance has improved considerably during the past 2 decades, increasing lion high-risk individuals who have never received influenza vaccine, many of whom are non-Hispanic blacks [21] . Of perthe potential for early detection of new antigenic variants and the development of suitable candidate strains for vaccine prohaps equal priority should be raising immunization coverage with pneumococcal vaccine, in view of the importance of pneuduction. This success has resulted largely from gradual expansion of the World Health Organization global surveillance netmococcal pneumonia as a secondary complication of influenza [1 -4] . JID 1997; 176 (Suppl 1) large-scale pneumococcal vaccination programs in the midst In an effort to cope with community disruption and increased demand for medical services on a national scale, contingency of an influenza pandemic further underscore the need to raise pneumococcal vaccine coverage levels far above the 29% estiplans for dealing with such emergencies are being developed in advance of the pandemic at the national, state, and local mate reported for high-risk patients in 1993 [21] .
Influenza vaccination programs conducted during the next levels. Such plans are being devised under the rubric of the Federal Response Plan (for Public Law 93-288, as amended), pandemic will pose a series of difficulties over and above those associated with the interpandemic period. These include expanin which the US Public Health Service (Office of Emergency Preparedness) serves as the lead for emergency support funcsion of the target population to nontraditional groups, such as healthy children and adults; the need for immunization of tens tions listed under ''Health and Medical Response'' [27] . Other elements of the Federal Response Plan, including ''Response of millions of persons within as short a time frame as possible; the ability to rapidly allocate and reallocate potentially limited and Recovery'' and ''State and Local Preparedness,'' will be coordinated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency supplies of influenza vaccine to individuals at highest risk of severe illness; determining the extent to which the United States (FEMA) through its regional offices, as well as state and county offices of emergency services. The Federal Interagency Commust respond to requests for influenza vaccine from foreign countries; and the development of an equitable program to mittee on Emergency Medical Services, through its Disaster Subcommittee, will also assist in improving coordination beprovide liability coverage for manufacturers and vaccine providers. These and other issues remain the focus of intense tween emergency medical and disaster program activities. A vast, multicomponent communications system must also be discussion and negotiation.
Chemoprophylaxis and therapy. Although widespread use developed to provide public health officials, practitioners, the media, and the general public with accurate and timely informaof currently licensed antiviral agents -amantadine and rimantadine -would seem to represent a reasonable strategy for both tion throughout the course of the pandemic. Influenza-related research. Most federal funds available prophylaxis and therapy of type A influenza during a pandemic -particularly when temporary shortages of influenza for influenza research are provided principally through the National Institutes of Health in the form of grant support for basic vaccine may exist -closer scrutiny of this approach suggests that it may not be feasible. Prophylaxis of even 10% of the scientists to study fundamental issues related to the genetics, molecular biology, and immunology of influenza viruses and US population for a 2-week period would require Ç700 million doses, an amount far exceeding the current production capacity infection. While it is essential to continue this support, a new and more focused program of applied research is needed to fill of US manufacturers. The potential for long-term stockpiling of the two drugs has also been considered but does not appear important gaps that would have a more direct and immediate impact on influenza prevention and control. Preliminary prioritto be feasible due to a short dating period, limitations in the availability of raw materials for drug synthesis, and other facies for such a program include improved methods for the detection of new variants of influenza viruses, the development and tors. In addition, the provision of adequate liability coverage for drug manufacturers and health care providers seems probpreliminary testing of prototype vaccines potentially containing the H2, H4, and H7 HA subtypes [8] , mechanisms to accelerate lematic due to the relatively vague nature of reported side effects of these two drugs [1] . Thus, barring the discovery of manufacturing processes for conventional inactivated influenza virus vaccines, and further development of novel antiviral more readily synthesized compounds, the use of antiviral agents during a pandemic, at least for the foreseeable future, will agents and alternative vaccines. These and other priorities were the principle focus for the meeting summarized in this issue likely be based on a carefully devised contingency plan that balances the needs for national security and maintenance of of the Journal, and readers should refer to other articles in this supplement for further information. essential community services (e.g., law enforcement and firefighting capability) with the prevention or mitigation of severe disease in high-risk patients. Summary Emergency preparedness. An important hallmark of influenza pandemics has been their ability to cause major disruption During the 20-year period following the most recent pandemic alert, a long progression of scientific, technologic, social, of routine medical services. As infection sweeps through the population, it first leads to an increase in respiratory illnesses, and political developments have made a comprehensive plan for confronting the next influenza pandemic a high priority for followed by increases in pneumonias and other infectionrelated complications, and then deaths [3, 4, 7] . Each of these the US Public Health Service, the Department of Defense, and other federal agencies. These developments have not only events compromises the ability of medical facilities to provide adequate care, especially when health care providers themincluded advancements in our knowledge and understanding of influenza per se but have also included far greater attention selves frequently become exposed and infected. Experience with the Spanish flu pandemic in 1918 also illustrates the enorto the more general problem of emerging infectious diseases; greater attention to preventive medical services, including adult mous potential of influenza for causing acute social disruption on a scale similar to or even greater than that caused by other immunization; greater interest, awareness, and active participation by the private sector and public at large in a wide variety natural disasters, but on a much wider geographic scale [10] .
